![]() ![]() There was nothing automatic about how the US would respond, however, or whether US authorities would emphasise bringing its allies on board. It was clear that a forceful military response to the 11 September attacks would come. NATO’s operational role was as yet undetermined, and it took time before the US made specific requests for military forces to deploy to Afghanistan. Like many other NATO allies, Norway at first took a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. The initial phase after 11 September was one of great uncertainty. It deals with Norwegian contributions to OEF and ISAF mainly up to 2006, when Faryab became Norway’s primary engagement area, and analyses the factors that played a role in determining the Norwegian contributions.Ĥ.1 Start-up phase: OEF and bilateral requests from the US This chapter describes the Norwegian military forces that took part in the operations in Afghanistan and that are not covered thematically in Chapters 5 and 8. The government remained mostly free to make the choice regarding which building blocks Norway would make available. The Norwegian authorities had views regarding certain aspects of this, but Norway and other smaller-scale contributors mainly limited themselves to furnishing military ‘building blocks’ for the US-driven strategy that guided the operations. As discussed in Chapter 3, the strategy underlying the international effort was primarily formulated by Washington, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and ISAF headquarters. Norway’s military effort may be termed ‘contribution warfare’, whereby Norway provided various contributions to OEF and ISAF largely without any underlying independent, long-term strategy other than the established national security policy principle that Norway should be a good ally. The Norwegian government in turn evaluated these military and economic assessments in light of Norway’s traditional emphasis on close security relations with the US and NATO, as well as against other political interests and considerations. This was weighed against costs and the units’ quality, availability, sustainability and security. The force requirements for the operations were important. ![]() What was most important was to support the US and NATO.ĭuring the period 2001–2014 many factors influenced Norway’s decisions as to which military units to deploy to Afghanistan and for how long. While the task of most Norwegian units in Afghanistan and all Norwegian units in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was to support state-building by helping to safeguard security, promoting state-building was not the primary objective of the Norwegian decision to deploy forces. Norway’s first military contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were designed to assist in the ‘war on terror’. Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries ![]() Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development ![]()
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